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ABSTRACT
Permissioned blockchains have resulted in some unlikely collaborations between organiza-
tions that would have previously been impossible due them mutually distrusting each other.
They provide a sense of trust among the parties due to the decentralized nature of their
deployment that prevents censorship from a subset of the parties. Decentralization man-
dates that all the parties have the same view of the system, therefore it has been difficult to
represent and store private data. Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing(AVSS) and Secure
Multi Party Computation(MPC) are techniques from cryptography that allow the sharing
of secrets among multiple parties and enable arbitrary computations on the shared data
without leaking any information about the data.
Previously, AVSS and MPC protocols were inefficient for practical use or did not work in
the same setting of blockchains where nodes of the blockchain could arbitrarily fail. Honey-
badger AVSS and Honeybadger MPC are robust and scalable frameworks that make them
a good candidate to be coupled with a permissioned blockchain to form a confidentiality
layer on top of it. We present Cloaking Fabric, an extension to the popular permissioned
blockchain Hyperledger Fabric that utilizes HoneybadgerMPC and HoneybadgerAVSS to
provide a confidentiality layer that would allow smart-contracts on the blockchain to inter-
act with private data. We present a suite of applications to demonstrate our system and
measure the overhead it would have over standard MPC operations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Organizations typically maintain and manage their own database for their operations[1][2].
There could be scenarios where an organization interacts with other organizations working
with them. Consider a supply chain setting[3] where there are usually many intermediate or-
ganizations involved between the source and the final consumer and each of them share some
data points with others. Traditionally the interaction between organizations that requires
data sharing is handled by a trusted third party or by one of the organizations themselves.
Aggregating petabytes of data under the control of one organization could have catas-
trophic impact. There have been a incidents like the Cambridge Analytica incident[4] where
collected user data was sold and wrongfully misused to direct targeted advertisements to
Facebook users. Some[5, 6] say that this incident had an impact on the 2016 US Presiden-
tial Elections. This has highlighted the intensity of impact with regard to misuse of data.
Laws like the GDPR(General Data Protection Regulation)[7] act by the European Union
have been since passed which aim to enforce strong constraints to how data is stored and
used[8] . This makes it important to have secure and scalable methods to allow collaboration
between organizations without revealing part or entirety of one party’s data to another.
A new variant of distributed systems called “blockchains” have emerged in the recent years.
Blockchains are replicated append-only databases where every participant maintains a copy
of the ledger and can participate in the consensus for deciding the new transactions. Ad-
ditionally blockchains can allow the execution of arbitrary programs called smart-contracts.
Blockchains have soared in popularity since the introduction of Bitcoin a peer-to-peer elec-
tronic currency[9] in 2009. There are numerous applications running on blockchains as they
are resistant to censorship due to a virtue of resilience by a replicated ledger. The CEO of
IBM has described blockchains to be the next big technology and predicts it to have the
same impact to what the Internet had for communication but with trusted transactions.
[10]. Blockchains are being used among companies in areas of health care[11, 12, 13] and
finance[14] to share data and collaborate.
Hyperledger Fabric[15] is a blockchain for the permissioned setting which caters to sce-
narios requiring better performance and throughput compared to that of permissionless
blockchains found in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and the permissioned nature makes it
easier to manage identities. This makes it ideal for use among organizations striving for a
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similar goal but are distinct entities and mutually distrust each other. However, blockchains
rarely provide mechanisms to support storing of confidential data and computing functions
without revealing the data. In the most common deployment scenario Fabric would work as
a transparent, fault tolerant and censorship resistant ledger so that all parties can maintain
the data at all times so that a subset of them cannot delete or destroy the data. This makes
the joint operations between organizations more meaningful. However, there are various sce-
narios where a portion of the data on the blockchain needs to be private due to restrictions
and laws set by governing bodies[16]. Blockchain deployments deployments[11, 13, 12] over-
come HIPAA[16] restrictions by making the restricted data freely available but log the usage
of data so that unauthorized access can be enforced later. Some scenarios where private
data is useful on blockchains are as follows:
• An organization might have setup complex operations pipelines involving some of its
private data as well. The application would be written for the blockchain and the
private data would need to be used by the application. For example, consider a hospital
which shares a blockchain with the pharmaceutical company. The hospital could have
setup orders and billing on the blockchain, the hospital would identify the orders with
patient information, it would be convenient if confidential patient information could
be made private and only the type and quantity of the order be made public.
• There are scenarios[17][18] where data held by one organization is not sufficient to
analyze meaningful trends or patterns. Multiple organizations need to perform data
mining together on their confidential data. This is especially true for hospitals and
financial firms where data is private. For example, it is in the best interest of hospitals
to have higher success rates on diagnosing, treating and controlling ailments and dis-
eases. But often a single hospital may not have enough information to conclude about
the best practices. Sharing their data with other hospitals is not straightforward as
there are privacy laws which restrict the usage of patient data.
Another burgeoning technology is Secure Multi Party Computation(MPC), In MPC the
goal is to allow multiple parties to jointly compute a function over every party’s inputs while
keeping the inputs private. MPC can be used to replace a trusted third party in a variety
of scenarios. Storing secret data in a blockchain with efficient access control is a non-trivial
problem to solve as the principle of blockchains requires the data to be replicated among all
the parties. Existing solutions[19, 20] for private data fall back to centralized components in
their protocol or avoid sharing the data itself but share a key among parties and store the
same encrypted data on all nodes(physical instance of a party) of the blockchain.
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Figure 1.1: Trade off between Availability and Confidentiality
It seems natural that coupling MPC with blockchains would give us a valuable symbiosis
between them that results in confidentiality and availability of data. In this thesis we
present Cloaking Fabric, a confidentiality layer for Hyperledger Fabric which aims to manage
secret data on the blockchain and allow arbitrary computations on them by providing a
secret namespace for chaincode(smart-contracts) to use. Figure 1.1 is an illustration of the
properties of blockchains vs properties of MPC toolkits, Multi-Party Computation provides
confidentiality but lacks in availability compared to blockchains. Cloaking Fabric would have
properties of both blockchains and MPC systems hence it is plotted on the far right corner
of the graph.
It has been challenging for such a system to exist in the past due to the following reasons.
• Permissioned blockchains were not customizable enough to build a confidentiality layer
on top of it efficiently.
• MPC toolkits in the past did not scale well with a large number of nodes and were
usually not fault-tolerant.
For Cloaking Fabric, we present a confidentiality layer for Hyperledger Fabric built us-
ing HoneybadgerMPC. HoneybadgerMPC presents a framework of protocols (Honeybadger
AVSS, Batch reconstruction, etc.) that work in a robust setting similar to blockchains where
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a threshold number nodes can arbitrarily fail.
For Cloaking Fabric, we utilize Hyperledger Fabric and HoneybadgerMPC to build a sys-
tem capable of availability and confidentiality. A node, peer or party in Fabric would be
equivalent to a party in HoneybadgerMPC. Hyperledger Fabric is a widely deployed permis-
sioned blockchain[21] that provides a strong base of features and supports customizability.
HoneyBadgerMPC [22] is a robust(can tolerate a certain number arbitrary node failures )
MPC framework.
To summarize, this thesis will present
1. Cloaking Fabric, a Confidentiality Layer for Hyperledger Fabric which enables chain-
codes to interact with private data and perform arbitrary computations with them.
2. An API for building applications which interact with private data. The API extends
on the chaincode programming model and adds suitable features to easily build appli-
cations.
3. A suite of applications to demonstrate the capabilities of Cloaking Fabric. We bench-
mark the running times of these applications and compute the overhead of using a
blockchain along with a MPC framework.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
This chapter explains the relevant background required to understand the remainder of
the thesis. Section 2.1 introduces the concept of blockchains and their different flavors with
regard to setting they are deployed in. Section 2.2 gives an overview into Hyperledger Fabric
and details the individual components that are used in Cloaking Fabric. Section 2.3 explains
Secret Sharing and Section 2.4 explains Secure Multi Party Computation.
2.1 BLOCKCHAIN
A blockchain is an immutable distributed ledger shared between mutually distrusting par-
ties where every party maintains a copy of ledger state. They were first made popular by
Bitcoin[9] which is a peer-to-peer electronic cash system(cryptocurrency).
The nodes execute a consensus protocol to order and validate transactions and maintain
consistency among themselves. There are two kinds of blockchain systems based on mem-
bership.
• Permissionless blockchains: In this type of blockchain anyone can download the node
software and participate without a specific identity. Some examples of permissionless
blockchains are Bitcoin and Ethereum. It is likely that a permissionless blockchain is
often coupled with a cryptocurrency to provide a economic incentive for the nodes to
participate in consensus.
• Permissioned blockchain: Permissioned blockchains, on the other hand, restrict mem-
bership to parties which can be identified and are known to each other. Permissioned
blockchains work best in a consortium setting, when the parties know each other and
have a common goal but are mutually distrustful of others e.g banks which transact
with each other, organizations in the same supply chain.
Some blockchains also allow the execution of arbitrary logic, first introduced as scripts
in Bitcoin and later as Smart Contracts in Ethereum[23]. Smart Contracts are popular for
building trusted distributed applications owing to the decentralized nature of blockchains.
Smart Contracts are usually required to be written in a domain specific programming lan-
guage as in the case of Solidity for Ethereum.
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2.2 HYPERLEDGER FABRIC
Hyperledger Fabric is an open source blockchain project started by IBM and now hosted
by the Linux Software Foundation. It aims to be permissioned blockchain with an emphasis
on modularity where components of the blockchain such as consensus module can be easily
swapped according to requirement.
Fabric aims to solve the following problems of prior blockchains:
• Fabric supports a per-application trust model with the help of endorsement policies
that specify the endorsement criteria for committing a transaction.
• Pluggable consensus modules in fabric help to satisfy the sentiment that there is no
“one size fits all” consensus protocol[24]. This allows Fabric to be deployed in differing
settings.
• Chaincodes in Fabric can be developed using general purpose programming languages
like Go and NodeJS. This sets a low barrier to entry for application developers and
allows for more complex applications due to the enormous support available in the
form of libraries.
2.2.1 Architecture of Fabric
Fabric overcomes the above limitations and aims to be a blockchain that focuses on re-
siliency, flexibility, scalability and confidentiality.
2.2.2 Order Execute Architecture
Blockchains follow the blueprint of State-Machine-Replication(SMR) which has been stud-
ied extensively in Distributed Systems literature[25][26]. Most traditional blockchain systems
follow the “order-execute” architecture. What this means is that the blockchain orders the
transactions first and runs them on all the nodes via State Machine Replication.
Typically, consensus in blockchains work as follows
1. Every participating node would create a block with all valid transactions.
2. The node would try and solve a cryptographic puzzle(Proof of Work).
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3. If the node was able to solve the puzzle it will disseminate via a gossip protocol the
block along with the solution to the puzzle.
4. On receiving the block every node executes the transactions in the block in the same
order and validates it.
In popular permissioned blockchains such as Tendermint[27], Chain[28] or Quorum[29]
some variant of Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus protocol is used. A popular variant is
PBFT[30]. They perform state machine replication by ordering the transactions first and
then executing the transactions in order.
Hyperledger Fabric is an exception to this, it drops Order-Execute for an Execute and
then Order architecture which allow it to achieve better throughput, scalability and flexi-
bility in writing smart contracts.
This can be described in three steps
1. Executing a transaction and checking its correctness.
2. Ordering through a consensus protocol irrespective of transaction semantics.
3. Validating the transaction according to the per-application trust assumptions.
This deviates from Order-Execute paradigm discussed in the previous section in the sense
that Fabric executes transactions before reaching an agreement on their order by combining
two well-known approaches to replication.
1. Passive replication: Similar to replication in distributed databases, here every trans-
action is executed on multiple peers. This can be thought of as pre-consensus compu-
tation of state updates.
2. Active replication: The ledger state after running a transaction is persisted only after
the total ordering is established in the validation phase done by every node. This can
be thought of as post-consensus validation of execution results.
In Fabric every transaction can be executed by a subset of peers, this is governed by the
application specific endorsement policy. At the endorser after simulating the transactions a
writeset(modified keys along with new values) and a read set(all read keys during execution)
are created. The readset and writeset are then cryptographically signed by the endorser and
sent back to the client as a proposal response. There is a possibility of endorsement policy
not being satisfied when there is a high contention of operations accessing the same key.
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2.2.3 Chaincode
Smart Contracts in Fabric are called chaincodes. It is the program code which imple-
ments the application logic. It can be written in general purpose programming languages
like Go, Java or Node.js.
Chaincodes can directly access the state of the blockchain and can invoke other chaincodes
assuming permissions and scope are correct. Chaincodes are executed in an environment
which is very loosely coupled to the actual peer. This allows for having support for different
programming languages for developing chaincode. The chaincode communicates via gRPC
messages. The loose coupling is achieved by having the chaincode run in its own docker
container.
Each chaincode can have multiple endpoints similar to REST endpoints on web servers.
Chaincode endpoints can take any number of arguments and return a string or JSON output.
2.2.4 System Chaincode
They are special chaincodes which exist for the purpose of managing the blockchain
system and internal parameters. Contrary to application chaincodes (chaincodes used to
build applications), System chaincodes run on the same peer process and have access to the
peer functionality directly. Some pre-installed chaincodes are the VSCC(Validation System
Chaincode) and QSCC(Query System Chaincode).
2.2.5 Endorsement Policy
Endorsement policy is the set of rules that Fabric follows for the validation phase. It
basically states the number of endorsements from peers to commit a transaction. Only
administrators of the blockchain can set the endorsement policy, the chaincode developers
will not be able to change it.
2.2.6 Ledger
The ledger component at each peer holds the ledger state on persistent store, it stores the
transaction blocks as a set of append only files. The blocks arrive in a definite order hence
the append only structure gives maximum performance.
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2.2.7 Ordering Service
A subset of nodes in a Fabric network provide a total ordering on the transactions. They
form the ordering service, a service independent of the peers which participate in execution.
This decoupling of ordering service nodes allows consensus to be pluggable and modular.
When a client has enough endorsements on a proposal it assembles a transaction and submits
it to the ordering service. The ordering service then establishes a total order on all submitted
transactions by a form of atomic broadcast of all the endorsements. Multiple transactions
are grouped as a block and a hash sequence of blocks is created. A crucial feature of Fabric is
that the ordering service does not execute any transaction on its own and does not maintain
the state of the system. This allows for the consensus to be modular.
2.2.8 Channels
Another interesting feature of Fabric is the support for essentially multiple blockchains
within the same context, which means they are connected to the same ordering service.
Every such blockchain is called a channel. They allow blockchains to be shared between
a subset of the parties. In a supply chain scenario, parties interacting with each other for
orders directly might wish to have a channel between them.
2.3 SECRET SHARING
Secret sharing is a technique for distributing a secret amongst a group of participants,
each of whom is allocated a share of the secret. The secret can be reconstructed only when
a sufficient number of shares of different types are combined together. Individual shares do
not reveal any information of the secret on their own. In general, given an t-share, at least
t+ 1 parties are required to reconstruct the corresponding secret.
Shamir secret sharing[31] is a popular secret-sharing scheme where t out of n secrets are
required to recover a secret. This is based on an idea that a unique t− 1 degree polynomial
can be fit to any set of t points that lie on the polynomial.
2.3.1 AVSS
In a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol the dealer shares a secret with a set of n parties
such that t+1 honest parties can reconstruct the secret. It is an essential component of secure
multiparty computation (MPC) protocols, used both for generating random preprocessing
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elements and for accepting secret-shared inputs from untrusted clients. Verifiability implies
that if any party receives its share, then every correct party also receives a valid share. This
is an important property for MPC applications since every honest party requires the share
to be available to them. Polynomial commitments by the dealer allow the parties to validate
the shares sent by the dealer in an independent manner. Asynchronous protocols have to
deal with crashed nodes and slow nodes. Since there is no way to distinguish between these
situations additional redundancy is required while distributing the shares so that parties
with invalid shares can recover their shares by interacting with other parties. The protocol
needs to satisfy correctness, confidentiality and agreement.
• Correctness: If the dealer is correct then all parties Pi will output share φ(i) where φ
is the random polynomial and φ(0) is the secret.
• Confidentiality: If the dealer is uncorrupted, then adversary will learn nothing about
the secret except for the output of the shares of the corrupted adversaries.
• Agreement: If any correct party receives output then there is a unique degree-t poly-
nomial φ′ such that each correct party eventually outputs φ′(i).
2.3.2 HoneyBadger of AVSS Protocols
Honeybadger of AVSS Protocols (HbAVSS)[32] provides linear amortized communication
overhead even in the worst case of tolerating f <n/3 Byzantine faults. Compared to the
previous work in the area which would provide optimal performance at only f <n/4 or a
fallback to quadratic overhead in case of Byzantine faults.
The main idea behind HbAVSS is borrowed from HoneybadgerBFT[33] where a technique
called encrypt-then-disperse was used. The secret shares are encrypted before they are
dispersed. This guarantees robustness and efficiency as secrecy need not be provided.
In an AVSS protocol the dealer receives an input secret which needs to be shared among n
parties. The n parties output a share for some t-degree polynomial. The shares from AVSS
are used as input for every party in MPC computations.
2.4 MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION
The setting for multi-party computation involves n parties P1, P2....Pn who compute a
function f which takes k secrets(S1, S2...Sk) as input parameters. The goal is to compute
y = f(S1, S2....Sk) while making sure correctness and privacy are preserved.
10
1. Correctness : The correct value of y is calculated, similar to what the value would be
if it were to be computed by a single party with all the inputs.
2. Confidentiality : There should be no other information be released except the output
y of the MPC computation.
2.4.1 Preprocessed Elements
Preprocessed elements simplify some of the computations involved in MPC. Preprocessed
elements are usually generated prior to the actual MPC computation.
• Beaver triples[34] : Beaver triples are used for evaluation of multiplications in an MPC
setting with t-shares. Each beaver triple is a triplet of t-shares [x]t, [y]t and [z]t such
that z = x ∗ y. We can use these triples to evaluate multiplication of shares [a]t and
[b]t by making use of the following equations.
M = Reconstruct([a]t − [x]t)
N = Reconstruct([b]t − [y]t)
[ab]t = M ∗N +M ∗ [y]t +N ∗ [x]t + [z]t
(2.1)
• Random bits : For many MPC applications, we need access to shares of a random
bit. That is, given a polynomial P (.) such that P (0) ∈ 0, 1, each party i will have
the share equal to P (i). Random bit shares can be generated directly using random
value shares. Given shares [r] of a random value r ∈ Zp we can generate a random bit
through the operation 1
2
( [r]√
Reconstruct([r]∗[r]) + 1) .
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CHAPTER 3: RELATED WORK
There have been prior attempts to have private data on blockchains as of this writing.
Some of the solutions rely on having encrypted data on the blockchain and having the key
managed by the party which owns the data.
3.1 HYPERLEDGER FABRIC CHANNELS
A Direct and simple solution as it a standard feature of Hyperledger Fabric. This allows
parties to share a private ledger among themselves and prevent access from other parties in
the network. However all the parties in the channel have full access to the ledger. For an
application like a sealed-bid auction the bids of all the parties would be visible in the system
and hence prevents to provide a finer level of privacy where nobody except the party can
access the secret.
3.2 ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOFS
Zero Knowledge proofs allow provers to establish a statement with other parties without
revealing any additional information. The party which has the secret would run a smart
contract on its own and prove to the others that the contract ran successfully and correctly.
This works in a setting where only one of the parties holds secret data.
3.3 HAWK PRIVACY PRESERVING BLOCKCHAIN
Hawk is a decentralized smart contract system that retains privacy of the transactions
from the view of the public. It extends the smart contract programming model and a pro-
grammer need not know or use additional cryptographic tools while writing a private smart
contract. The programming model adds constructs to define and differentiate between public
and private data. They present a concept of a manager who would know the users inputs
but would not disclose them. The manager need not be trusted and could be caught and
reprimanded(loss of deposit) in case of deviation from protocol. They open up discussions
about future work where MPC could be used to build the manager. Cloaking Fabric
would be along the lines of the manager described in Hawk.
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3.4 SOLIDUS
Solidus[35] is a system to have confidential transactions on public blockchains. They
leverage Zero Knowledge Proofs along with the concept of Oblivious-RAM. Oblivious-RAM
hides the memory access patterns of a program without changing the input and output or the
algorithm itself. Solidus can hide the details of the transaction and the participants by using
publicly verifiable Oblivious-RAM which combines Zero Knowledge Proofs with Oblivious-
RAM to hide identities of the individual participant. Solidus is designed for settings where
every transactions would depend on secrets of one participant.
3.5 ENIGMA
Enigma[36] is a system that supports computations on private data in a decentralized
setting. Enigma is more of an off-chain privacy framework as it runs a modified version of
secure MPC among parties different from the parties of the blockchain. It is meant to be
used to oﬄoad privacy protected computations by smart contracts on existing blockchains
like Ethereum. Enigma uses a variant of the popular SPDZ[37] protocol for the Multi Party
Computation, SPDZ is not a robust protocol and would halt on failures.
3.6 CALYPSO
Calypso[19] is a decentralized private data management system for blockchains. The
secrets are encrypted and stored as a whole on the blockchain. However the access control
and identity management happens via a different network. The symmetric key required to
decrypt the on-chain secret is secret shared among the participants of this side network. The
access control primitives they provide are fairly substantial and can cover most uses cases
including transfer of ownership of data. However since they are not storing the actual shares
of the secret but storing the encrypted data. The applications are restricted to a store and
retrieve kind, MPC operations are not possible.
3.7 MPC JOINS THE DARK SIDE
Cartlidge et al. present[38] a solution for dark pools in financial markets. Dark pools
in financial markets which are pools of potential buyers and sellers of a service that want
to purchase or sell in large volume without indicating their interest so as to not inflate
the market value. Dark pools traditionally employ third party trusted brokers to handle
13
the sales and orders. In case of a failure mode of a trusted third party like leaking the
orders beforehand, the market rates tend to fluctuate and cause catastrophic losses for the
clients. They implement a solution for this using Scale-Mamba MPC toolkit. They present
a Continuous double auction where they arrange bids in descending order and offers in the
ascending order to form a Limit Order Book such that the highest bid and lowest order
form a spread and decide what incoming bids and orders would be matched to transact.
Scale-Mamba implements an actively secure MPC protocol which guarantees security up to
one failure, which means on detecting a failure the MPC computation stops.
3.8 STRAIN
Strain[39] by Blass et al. is an auction protocol for blockchains which guarantees bid.
Strain use Zero-Knowledge proofs to do pairwise comparison between bids and publishing
them on the blockchain. Strain does not utilize secret sharing or MPC primitives hence
caters to a weaker adversarial model than MPC where the adversary is aware of the order
of bid by amount. This helps them achieve an optimal complexity of O(n) and 3blocks ,
which makes it perfect for permissionless blockchains. They also mention in the paper that
Hyperledger Fabric would potentially be a good platform for secure auctions however did
not have anonymity guarantees provided.
3.9 SUPPORTING PRIVATE DATA ON HYPERLEDGER FABRIC WITH SECURE
MPC
The paper[40] By IBM Research presents a system to store secrets on a blockchain and
perform MPC on the secret data. They use Hyperledger Fabric as the blockchain and write
a chaincode to achieve the same. Parties store the data on the ledger encrypted with their
own secret key, when it needs to use the data for a transaction the party would decrypt the
ledger data and use it as an input to a transaction.
They describe the use of a ”helper” server to set up communication channels for inter
peer communication. They acknowledge the insecure nature of this and state that this is
was done to demonstrate the possibility of such a system. The system stores encrypted data
on the blockchain, the key to encrypt this data is held by special parties known as ”privileged
clients”.
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They discuss some properties that their system does not possess but a production system
in the future might possess.
1. Endorsement Policy : They point out that it is important to align the trust model of
the secure-MPC protocol with the endorsement policy i.e A protocol that can tolerate t
adversarial parties should have an endorsement policy that requires at least t+1 peers
to endorse a transaction. They also note that non-standard endorsement policies can
be supported by using System chaincodes.
2. Enforcing rogue peers : A rogue peer is a peer that exploits the “execute and then
endorse nature” of fabric to block transactions that do not align with the interests of
the peer after executing the MPC protocol.
3. Support multiple parties : Their demo supports only three parties due to the
underlying MPC protocol used which does not scale to more nodes.
This paper presents a lot of ideas that we will directly use in our implementation.
3.10 MATRIX
The work by Assi Barak et al. titled “An End-to-End System for Large Scale P2P MPC-
as-a-Service and Low-Bandwidth MPC for Weak Participants”[41] discusses the importance
of coordination in MPC i.e. getting multiple parties to start the MPC operation at the same
time. They present MPSaaS(MPC as a service) which uses a system called MATRIX that
helps coordinate the participation and running of MPC. MATRIX allows administrators
to specify the name, description and the start time of the MPC operation along with the
type of circuit. MATRIX is a centralized service and hence is a single point of failure for
availability.
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CHAPTER 4: DESIGN
4.1 PRELIMINARIES
4.1.1 Flexible Trust Model of Fabric
A property of Fabric is flexibility in its trust model which is the reason it very well may
be deployed in various scenarios. The components of Fabric like the ordering service are
pluggable and can be changed based on the deployment requirements. There are various de-
cisions to be made while deciding the ordering service. Fabric presents a centralized orderer,
a cluster-based orderer running a Crash Fault Tolerant consensus protocol like Raft[42] or
Kafka[43] and even BFT protocols like BFT-SMaRt[26] can be used. Endorsement policy
is the number of endorsements that are required for committing a transaction. This can be
set on a per application level and allows for different security settings for each application
e.g. ANY(‘Org1.nodes’) would enforce that the transaction be signed by any one node from
Organization 1.
4.1.2 Network Model
In the asynchronous network model there are no timing assumptions i.e. there is no bound
on the time for messages to be delivered within. HoneyBadgerMPC and HoneyBadgerAVSS
work in asynchronous settings as there are no timeout assumptions in the implementations
of both. Endorsement policies of Fabric let us extend this to the endorser nodes as well
where the first 2n/3 + 1 valid endorsements would be sufficient to commit a transaction. At
the time of writing, Fabric version 1.4 ships with a partially synchronous ordering service
implemented in Raft[42] and Kafka[43]. However, the pluggable consensus model of Fabric
allows future work to use HoneyBadgerBFT[33] which is BFT consensus in an asynchronous
setting. A partially synchronous network model could be supported by using PBFT or Raft
as the consensus module of the orderer. In this model the consensus algorithm would assume
a δ bound for the delivery time of the messages. This δ could be something that is adaptive
and changes as the protocol proceeds or could be static and set by the protocol developer.
4.1.3 Confidentiality
Confidentiality in our context implies that a secret shared by a user is not made public
unless the user leaks it or it is used as a part of a chaincode application which reconstructs
16
secrets at some point. The output of an MPC operation is also private to the participants
unless explicitly specified.
HoneyBadgerAVSS guarantees that if the dealer(client/party) is correct the adversary
would learn nothing about the secret. HoneyBadgerMPC guarantees that apart from the
output of the computation, the parties will not learn the other party’s inputs. Endorsement
policies on Fabric and (n, t) configuration on HoneyBadgerMPC enforce that an adversary
cannot arbitrarily start reconstruction on a secret.
4.1.4 Integrity
Integrity in our context implies that the results of the arbitrary computations performed
be true to the MPC program i.e. the result of a MPC computation running on Cloaking
Fabric should be the same as the MPC computation running on HoneybadgerMPC. Integrity
could also mean that the value of a secret or the metadata is not wrongly changed by an
adversary. This is prevented by having write-once secrets which allow write only from the
authenticated client. It is common practice to open-source chaincode and the MPC programs
so that they can be verified publicly.
4.1.5 Availability
Availability is defined as access to the chaincode and the data without censorship. The
ledger is replicated in Fabric and information such as metadata is available on every single
node. HoneybadgerAVSS can tolerate t failures, hence even in the case of f <= t failures,
secrets can be recovered. Similarly, HoneyBadgerMPC is a robust MPC framework that
tolerates t failures as well. Which means that the protocol does not halt even when there
are f <= t failures.
4.2 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section we will discuss the overall design of Cloaking Fabric. Figure 4.1 shows the
end-to-end working of Cloaking Fabric with respect to a single client who interacts with the
system. The client interacts with Cloaking Fabric by sharing secrets which could be used
as input to MPC, the MPC completes and publishes the result of the computation on the
blockchain. The user has the ability to recover his secret input from the blockchain using
private reconstruction.
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Figure 4.1: Cloaking Fabric in action
Cloaking Fabric is an extension for the existing Hyperledger Fabric system. We extend on
it by building a system chaincode which interfaces with HoneybadgerMPC. Cloaking Fabric
is roughly made up of the following components.
1. HoneyBadgerMPC : A general purpose toolkit for performing robust, scalable Multi
Party Computation.
2. HoneyBadger System Chaincode : The system chaincode that interfaces with Honey-
BadgerMPC and provides an abstraction for secret cells.
3. HoneyBadger Chaincode API : The API for chaincode developers to use to build
applications that interact with secret cells.
4.3 HONEYBADGERMPC
HoneybadgerMPC is a multi-purpose MPC toolkit for running MPC applications as well
as sharing and reconstructing secret data. HoneybadgerMPC is written in Python and we
have a modified version of HoneybadgerMPC to interface with Fabric. It is important to
use a robust MPC toolkit as Fabric works in a setting where nodes can arbitrarily crash and
execution of chaincode should still go on seamlessly. If we use a non-robust MPC toolkit the
MPC execution would halt on a single failure, any partial subset endorsement policy would
turn out to be redundant.
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These are some of the components of HoneyBadgerMPC that we build on.
• HbAVSS : An AVSS protocol that robustly tolerates up to t adversaries and allows
for constant size commitments. AVSS uses sockets to communicate with other peers
and hence we had to add modify the peer container to support the communication
between AVSS peers.
• Robust Reconstruction : HoneyBadgerMPC allows for robust batch-based recon-
struction of secrets. The interface of reconstruction is natural and easy to use and uses
some of the same network primitives as HbAVSS.
• Preprocessing : To make certain operations faster, HoneyBadgerMPC uses pre-
computed random bits and/or beaver triples during execution. HoneyBadgerMPC
has a comprehensive oﬄine phase that generates and replenishes these preprocessed
elements.
• MPC context : MPC context allows multiple parties to compute a function together
by running the same code but have access to different shares of the data. This is
implemented using asyncio and every operation that requires network communication
is awaited on.
4.4 ARCHITECTURE
The Fabric ledger is shared by all the participants in the network and therefore they
all share the same ledger state. For Cloaking Fabricwe need state which is private to a
particular peer. Every share of a secret should be held by a unique peer to maintain the
reconstructability property of the shares. If the shares were to be stored on the same ledger,
all shares would be accessible to an adversary who could reconstruct the secret at any point.
The shares would be stored in the individual nodes private state which for us is a Level-DB
instance. Figure 4.3 dissects the node and lists the components layer by layer.
The metadata i.e. the public properties of the cell, should be stored on the public ledger
and should be consistent among nodes. Figure 4.4 shows the network level view of the
Cloaking Fabric. The public ledger is always in sync and agreed upon by the nodes but the
private state is maintained independently by every node.
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4.5 HONEYBADGER SYSTEM CHAINCODE (HONEYBADGERSCC)
HoneyBadgerSCC is Fabric system chaincode that essentially interfaces with Honeybad-
gerMPC to provide an abstraction of secret cell. A secret cell is a write once structure
that can hold a single value of secret data and its metadata is stored on the public ledger.
A secret cell has the following properties.
• CellName : The name of the secret cell. It is the identifier for the secret cell and
this value is used for all input and output fields which use secret cells. The cell name
is set by the application and it is shared with the client who uses the cellname as a
parameter while running AVSS on his secret input. CellName is also the primary key
of the secret cell and cannot be changed in the lifecycle of the secret cell.
• IsWritten : A boolean value which indicates whether a cell has been written by the
intended writer yet. The flag acts as a barrier for moving into the MPC phase of the
application chaincode. This is updated by the system chaincode when the respective
share for a given secret cell is received by the node and is validated to be correct.
• WriterKey : The writer key is the main access control primitive for Cloaking Fabric.
The client interacting with the application passes their public key as an argument to
the application chaincode endpoint. The application chaincode then creates and sets
the WriterKey to that of the communicating client. When the client has to AVSS the
values they provide valid certification to the system chaincode. The WriterKey when
set to null indicates that no client can write to a secret cell. This is especially useful
when the output of an MPC computation is a secret cell.
• IsOpen : A boolean which indicates if the secret data has been reconstructed yet or
not. The IsOpen field is initially set to false but it is set to true once the reconstruction
completes and the node receives the opened value.
• Value : This holds the value of the cell once the secret data has been reconstructed.
Once the value is made public it is irreversible as the value would be known to all
the nodes. The value field is initially empty and is only set after the reconstruction is
completed by opening a share.
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Figure 4.4: An illustration of a workflow involving secret sharing
4.6 OPERATIONS ON SECRET CELLS
4.6.1 Share Secret
Figure 4.4 illustrates the typical workflow during secret sharing. The client interacts with
a chaincode endpoint and may be asked for input to a secret cell in some scenarios. The
Application chaincode provides the client with the name of the secret cell and creates an
entry for the secret cell by sending a request to HoneybadgerSCC.
The writer of a cell (application sets the public key of the writer) creates shares of the
secret input and starts HbAVSS as a dealer to the other endorsing nodes. The endorsing
nodes on completing HbAVSS successfully would store the share to their private state and
update the cell’s IsWritten to true. Depending on how many endorsers set the state and
endorsement policy of the system, the transaction will be committed and the cell can be used
in applications. In any event that the AVSS does not complete either due to a malicious
client(dealer) or more than supported node failures(f > t), the secret is not shared and
IsWritten remains false.
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4.6.2 Private Reconstruction
Private Reconstruction is a primitive provided by Cloaking Fabric for scenarios when the
client wants to retrieve a previously shared secret from the system. The client would sign a
message with his private key and request for the individual shares from the endorsers. The
endorsers after validating the identity of the user would return the shares for the partic-
ular cell. The client then runs reconstructions provided by HoneybadgerMPC locally and
reconstructs the secret. Figure 4.5 shows the working of private reconstruction.
4.6.3 Public Reconstruction
In public reconstruction all endorsers participate together to reconstruct the secret from
the shares they individually hold. Public reconstruction is used as a primitive in MPC
operations and is useful for applications where an input has to be private for a certain
duration of time and then needs to be revealed after satisfying a condition. Application
chaincode would decide when it is time to reconstruct a secret, this would usually be after a
certain number of inputs are available to be opened or a certain duration of time has elapsed
since the creation of the instance. Figure 4.6 illustrates the working of Public Reconstruction.
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Figure 4.6: Public reconstruction of a cell
Public Reconstruction works in two phases from the point of view of application chaincode.
1. Application chaincode calls reconstructSecret API call to start the reconstruction
phase. This returns true if the reconstruction was started successfully.
2. Application chaincode then calls GetCellMetadata to retrieve the metadata of the
cell. It then checks the IsOpen attribute to check if the reconstruction was successful.
and proceeds to use the reconstructed Value
4.6.4 MPC Operation(mpcOp)
mpcOp is a function to start MPC on the nodes. mpcOp takes a list of secret cells as input,
the type of the MPC operation as an argument, instance name of the MPC operation and
starts the MPC operation on the respective nodes. MPC operation is called by application
chaincode when a certain condition is met e.g number of inputs, time elapsed, number of
blocks in the blockchain. MPC operation only starts the MPC on the nodes, it sets a flag
and result once the operation is complete. checkMPCResult is able to retrieve the result
from the MPC operation.
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1 func ReadAorB(choice) {
2 if readToken.valid() {
3 readToken.use()
4 if choice == "A" {
5 return readSecret("A")
6 } else {
7 return readSecret("B")
8 }
9 } else {
10 return Error("No read token")
11 }
12 }
Figure 4.7: Demonstration of breach in confidentiality due to speculative reads
4.7 SUPPORT FOR BARRIERS
4.7.1 Speculative Execution in Fabric
In the previous section we described the architecture of Fabric and how it follows a ex-
ecution paradigm different from other blockchains. Executing a transaction first and then
deciding the order and validity of the transaction based on read-write conflicts causes the
execution to be speculative in nature. Although this sort of architecture allows for a higher
throughput in general due to execution to be done by a subset of nodes, down side is mak-
ing sure side effects from not committing a transaction do not breach the confidentiality or
integrity of the system. This behavior is documented in the Fabric paper [15] and detailed
in work from IBM Research[44].
4.7.2 Side Effects from Speculation
A side effect occurs when a transaction performs an irreversible operation that cannot be
undone in the validation phase in the event the transaction is not committed. A side effect
could be something as simple as returning the result of an uncommitted transaction.
Consider the above example in figure 4.7. The function here allows the user to read a
secret either A or B but not both. In the event that there are two simultaneous calls to the
function in Fabric i.e before one of the transactions are committed, there is a chance that a
malicious user would be allowed to read both the secrets. These hazards can be exploited
in a variety of settings if the application does not handle it correctly.
• Free reads in Pay for access: a client may purchase a “token” to read one record
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1 func sampleApplication () {
2 A = reconstructSecret("a")
3 B = reconstructSecret("b")
4 if checkValidity(A) && checkValidity(B) {
5 applicationLogic ()
6 } else {
7 return Error()
8 }
9 }
Figure 4.8: Demonstration of a hazard in application chaincode using Cloaking Fabric
from the database, e.g. to download an e-book. Speculative reads would let a client
effectively double spend that token.
• Escape Audit Logs : Access logging[16] is a pragmatic approach to privacy by allowing
clients easy access to a large data source but audit every time a client reads data, this
enforces accountability on the reader of the data as they can be tracked if they read
the data without authorization. This sort of speculative execution can be exploited by
malicious clients to read data without being logged.
• Zero knowledge proof or related cryptography gadgets: Zero knowledge proofs and
other similar class of protocols in cryptography there is an established pattern where
the “proof verifier” is only allowed to choose only one value to read. In such a scenario
speculative reads can be used to read more than required amount of data.
Naturally such issues could arise in applications using Cloaking Fabric. We have irre-
versible operations in reconstructing private data and MPC computations.
In Figure 4.8, The application chaincode attempts to reconstruct two related secret cells
for a transaction and then checks the validity of the cells. In the event that the second cell
does not exist the transaction is not valid, however the first secret would have irreversibly
been reconstructed.
4.7.3 Barriers
To address the above problem of speculative execution hazards we have a couple methods
to serve as barriers for application programmers. Barriers essentially force the application
logic to wait for the prior condition to be updated and set on the blockchain. The barrier
fields are only updated in the blockchain if the endorsement policy is met. The following
fields can be used as barrier fields. A solution to the hazard in Figure 4.8 using barriers is
show in Figure 4.7.3.
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1 func sampleApplication () {
2 A = getSecretCell("a")
3 B = getSecretCell("b")
4 if A.isOpen && B.isOpen {
5 // running application logic when both the cells are open
6 applicationLogic ()
7 }
8 else if A.isWritten && B.isWritten && additionalAppCondition {
9 // opening the cell when both the cells have been written
10 A.reconstruct ()
11 B.reconstruct ()
12 } else {
13 return Error()
14 }
15 }
Figure 4.9: Demonstration of the use of barriers
1. IsWritten : this field is updated only when the secret is shared by the client success-
fully. That involves AVSS being run by (2/3n)+1 nodes, then the secret cell structure
needs to be updated on the blockchain which requires (2n/3) + 1 signatures from the
endorsers.
2. IsOpen : similarly this is updated only when the share is opened successfully, requires
at least (2n/3) + 1 nodes to complete the opening.
3. checkMPCResult() : A function in the Honeybadger chaincode API which returns if
the MPC result is available or not. Since the MPC operation is asynchronous, this is
helpful in determining if the MPC operation has completed or not.
Application chaincode must be written in a way that they return no other information if
the barrier condition is not satisfied and the client is expected to be polling to check the
result of an operation.
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CHAPTER 5: APPLICATIONS AND EVALUATION
In this section we present some applications built using Cloaking Fabric. We then evaluate
the performance of these applications and compare Cloaking Fabric with related work.
5.1 APPLICATIONS
We present three different applications to show the working of Cloaking Fabric. First
we present a (1) secure Rock Paper Scissors game which utilizes secret cells to reduce
the number of phases compared to traditional implementations. We then demonstrate the
capability to do MPC on secret cells with three applications (2) a secure sealed bid
auction and (3) secure linear regression.
5.1.1 Rock Paper Scissors
We present a new take on the classic Rock Paper Scissors game to showcase an application
that interacts with secret cells. The user inputs will be secret shared using HbAVSS and
stored in secret cells. Only when both the parties have shared their input the reconstruction
phase can start, after which the inputs are made public for the result to be computed and
published.
Consider a traditional rock paper scissors smart contract[45] which does not have the
ability to access or store private data. The users provide a commitment of their move(which
could be the move hashed along with a random seed). Once both the players input their
moves. One of the players starts the reveal phase by revealing his commitment(providing the
move and the random seed individually to the chaincode). The second player has a limited
time to reveal his move after the first player has revealed his move. Once both the users
have revealed their move the result is computed and published. If the second player fails to
reveal his move in the allocated time, he forfeits.
The above approach is divided into two distinct phases (1). Users input their move and
(2). Users reveal their move. A failure mode here would be in phase (2) where a malicious
player learns that his move is not the winning move after the other player’s move is revealed
and decides to exit the protocol without revealing their move. To counter this a timeout is
added after the first player reveals their move, else a penalty is imposed on the player.
Timeouts have issues of their own. In blockchains where transactions rates are low, time-
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1 if fn == "createGame" {
2 // creates a game
3 memcell := getMemoryCellName ()
4 createCell(memcell , userKey)
5 // create a memory cell for the user move
6 game := createGame(gameName , userKey , "None", memcell , None)
7 game.save()
8 return Success(memcell)
9 } else if fn == "joinGame" {
10 memcell := getMemoryCellName ()
11 createCell(memcell , userKey)
12 game := GetGame(gameName)
13 game.user2Key = userKey
14 game.user2Move = memcell
15 game.save()
16 return Success(memcell)
17 }
18 else if fn == "getActiveGames" {
19 // returns the active game lobby
20 return getActiveGames(stub)
21 } else if fn == "getCompletedGames" {
22 // returns the completed games scoreboard
23 return getCompletedGames(stub)
24 } else if fn == "startRecon" {
25 game := GetGame(gameName)
26 cell1 = GetCellMetadata(game.user1Move)
27 cell2 = GetCellMetadata(game.user2Move)
28 if cell1.IsWritten && cell2.IsWritten {
29 // reconstruct only when both values are available
30 reconstructSecret(cell1)
31 reconstructSecret(cell2)
32 return Success("Started Reconstruct");
33 } else {
34 return Failure("InputNotShared")
35 }
36 } else if fn == "getResult" {
37 // result of the game if the moves have been completed
38 cell1 = GetCellMetadata(game.user1Move)
39 cell2 = GetCellMetadata(game.user2Move)
40 if( if cell1.IsOpen && cell2.IsOpen ){
41 // computeResult applied RPS logic on the cells
42 return Success(computeResult(cell1 , cell2))
43 } else {
44 return Failure("Input not Opened")
45 }
46
47 }
Figure 5.1: A simplified version of the Rock Paper Scissors Chaincode
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Figure 5.2: Ideal functionality of Secure Rock Paper Scissors
outs increase the total game time and are a hindrance to legitimate users who fail to reveal
their move on time due to network delays. More importantly it makes the players interact
multiple times which makes it less intuitive.
To understand how Rock, Paper Scissors would work with a trusted third party we can
observe the ideal functionality in Figure 5.2. In our solution the chaincode would be the
trusted third party which reconstructs the user inputs only after both the users have shared
their move.
The user who creates the game would interact with createGame endpoint in Figure 5.1.
createGame creates an instance of the game and a secret cell to which the user will share
his move. The user is then expected to share his move via HbAVSS. Potential players view
active games by invoking the getActiveGames endpoint, they then use the name of the game
to joinGame and share their move. Any entity can ask for the result for the result to be
computed by invoking startRecon on the game instance, this would start reconstruction on
the cells only if both the cells are available. Once the reconstruction is completed the result
would be available by invoking checkResult. In our approach the users can just “fire and
forget” their input and need not wait for the other user to make their move to start the
reveal phase. Result of previous games would be available by invoking getCompletedGames
endpoint. This simple application demonstrates the power of a blockchain system with access
to managing secret data and could easily be used for other applications such as bidding and
betting. The unique programming model of Cloaking Fabric helps us build useful features
like lobbies and scoreboard for the games.
Here, we make sure the fundamental properties are satisfied.
1. Confidentiality : The user’s input should not be made public until both the users
submit their moves. This is guaranteed by not starting the reconstruction until both
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1 async def auction_mpc(context , bids):
2 max_bid = bids [0]
3 for i in range(1, len(bids)):
4 t = await max_bid.gt(bids[i]) # t = max_bid < bids[i]
5 max_bid = (await (t.mul(max_bid.sub(bids[i])))).add(bids[i])
6 # max_bid = (t* (max_bid - bids[i])) + bids[i]
7 return max_bid
Figure 5.3: MPC program for Secure Auction
Max(B1,B2,B3,B4,B5)
Winning Bid
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
B1
B2
B3
B4
B2
Figure 5.4: Ideal functionality of secure Auction
inputs are written.
2. Integrity : Integrity implies that a user’s move should not be changed after recon-
struction has started. Since the secret cells of Cloaking Fabric are write once, this
property is guaranteed.
3. Availability : Availability should guarantee that no party should be able to halt the
computation of the result after participating in the game. By avoiding a reveal phase
we ensure that no malicious party cannot halt the execution of the contract.
5.1.2 Secure Auctions
Auctions have always been a cornerstone application for demonstrating MPC ever since
the first live real use case of MPC was used for a beets auction in Denmark[46]. The
ideal functionality of a secure auction using a trusted third party is shown in Figure 5.4.
A corrupt trusted third party especially in auctions has too much power to change the
natural execution of the auction, the third party could collude with a participant, they
could also reveal incorrect information to drive the price, hence a decentralized auction is
highly desirable when the stakes of the auction are high. It is often a requirement for auctions
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Figure 5.5: Workflow of a Secure Auction
where the bids of the participating members of the auction be private. This is done so as to
avoid malicious behavior of the participants who could in theory collude with a subset of the
parties, exit the auction abruptly and disturb the flow of the auction. Making an auction
“decentralized” replaces the trusted third party with MPC.
We present a first price auction where we implement an auction as an MPC program and
deploy it on Cloaking Fabric. The chaincode can run multiple instances of the auction, it
identifies the auction by a name provided by the creator. The creator would then provide
additional parameters such as participant list and an end condition such as maximum number
of bids or a certain duration of time as the end point. Similar to the Rock, Paper, Scissors
example the participants could view the auction via a lobby and decide to join the auction.
Figure 5.5 presents the workflow of an auction with multiple clients and Figure 5.9 shows
the chaincode snippet for the same. The creator of the auction specifies the total number
of bids required to conduct the auction in createAuction and the auction MPC program
starts once that condition is met. We implement the MPC program for the auction in Figure
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Figure 5.6: Ideal functionality of Linear Regression
5.3. Here we do sequential comparisons[47] to implement a Max function. In order to not
reveal the order of bids we refrain from using “if/else” statements and open the max value
only at the end.
The fundamental properties are satisfied here as follows.
1. Confidentiality : The bids of the users are required to be private and only the
winning bid is made public, there is no information revealed about the relative order
of the bids.
2. Integrity : Auction must compute the winner accurately, we rely on the underlying
MPC program to work as advertised, since the code is open source it can be thoroughly
inspected for correctness. We use FixedPoint integers of the range [−231, 231 − 2−32]
for the secret shared values. An adversary could enter a bid which is not in this range.
To validate the bid we suggest future work to use Zero Knowledge Ranged proofs[48]
to prove that the input lies in a particular range.
3. Availability : Parties should be able to participate in the auctions freely. The pro-
gramming model allows for lobby style interfaces which could announce an auction well
in advance so that all interested parties know about an auction in advance. Malicious
users cannot halt the auction after making their bid.
5.1.3 Linear Regression
Linear Regression is a statistical technique of modelling the relationship between a depen-
dent variable and one or more explanatory (independent) variable[49]. The relationships are
modeled using linear predictor functions which who’s unknown parameters are estimated
from the data. Linear Regression is used in a lot of finance, health data and forecasting
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analytics. The ability to perform Linear Regression with private data inputs would be in-
valuable to users of Hyperledger Fabric.
Given a dataset consisting of n data points with independent variables {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
and the corresponding dependent variables {y1, y2, . . . , yn}, a linear regression model can be
used to fit a line between x and y.
The best-fit line can be parameterised with two parameters, m for the slope of the line
and b for the y-intercept, such that y = mx + b. In general, a finite error i will be present
in our observations of the independent variables.
yi = xi + i (5.1)
In order to find a best-fit model, we attempt to minimize the least-squares error of our
model which is given by the following equation
J(m, b) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
(yi − (mxi + b))2 (5.2)
A closed-form solution exists for the parameters m and b that minimize this error. How-
ever, the closed form solution involves matrix inversions which are not supported by Hon-
eyBadgerMPC at this point. We instead resolve to using a gradient-descent based approach
to find the best parameters.
In a gradient-based approach, we first randomly pick initial values for m and b as m0 and
b0 respectively. We then iteratively do the following operations -
mt+1 = mt − α ∗ ∂J
∂m
(5.3)
bt+1 = bt − α ∗ ∂J
∂b
(5.4)
We use fixed-point arithmetic [50] for linear regression, and use beaver triples for multi-
plication. Random bits required for fixed-point arithmetic are generated and stored as part
of a preprocessing phase.
The ideal functionality for Linear Regression is shown in Figure 5.6 and we implement it
by replacing the trusted third party by an MPC program[51]. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 provide
the chaincode for implementing Linear Regression. The chaincode interface is similar to that
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of secure auction and differs in the number of parameters.
The fundamental properties are satisfied here as follows.
1. Confidentiality : To satisfy confidentiality the x and y coordinates of the point should
not be revealed. The MPC program[51] does not open the x and y coordinates in their
raw form. Only the slope and intercept will be opened.
2. Integrity : We use FixedPoint integers of the range [−231, 231 − 2−32] for the secret
shared values. An adversary could enter a point which is not in this range. To validate
the bid we suggest future work to use Zero Knowledge Ranged proofs[48] to prove that
the input lies in a particular range.
3. Availability : All parties should be able to participate in the Linear Regression freely
and no client should be able to halt the execution. client in our model just “fire and
forget” the input points and are not expected to participate further.
5.2 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
5.2.1 Go Plugins
We implement HoneybadgerSCC as a system chaincode and we opted to build it as a Go
plugin which would allow it to be loaded dynamically in our test system. This helped us
rapidly prototype and make changes and test them immediately. The standard technique
of building system chaincodes involves bundling it with the other system chaincodes and
rebuilding Fabric. We found this approach to be detrimental to prototyping and testing.
For compiling the system chaincode we create a docker container of the same type as the
final fabric peer and mount the file system and compile the image. We found this approach
to reduce build times to a few seconds.
5.2.2 Test Network
We tested our system on the first network example network provided in the
fabric-samples[52] repository. It uses a 4 peer system with a single certificate authority
and a single node ordering service. In first network there are two organizations and each
organization has 2 nodes. For our tests we have considered all nodes to be independent and
distrustful of all other nodes.
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1 type LinReg struct {
2 ObjectType string ‘json:" docType"‘
3 Name string ‘json:"name"‘
4 EndPoints int ‘json:endPoints ‘
5 Participants [] string ‘json:" participants"‘
6 X [] string ‘json:"X"‘
7 Y [] string ‘json:"Y"‘
8 M int ‘json:"M"‘
9 B int ‘json:"B"‘
10 Result string ‘json:" Result"‘
11 }
Figure 5.7: Linear Regression Instance Structure
A comparison of properties of different systems
Name Support for pri-
vate data
Availability Arbitrary Com-
putations
Cloaking Fabric Yes Yes Yes
Calypso Yes Yes No
HyperMPC(MATRIX) Yes No Yes
Fabric No Yes Yes
Scale-Mamba Yes No Yes
Table 5.1: Feature Matrix of different systems
5.3 EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of Cloaking Fabric and identify bottlenecks
and overheads. We also compare Cloaking Fabric with related work and discuss the different
attributes and trade-offs.
5.3.1 Feature Comparison
Table 5.1 is a feature matrix of related systems. The properties discussed are
• Support for private data: A system supports private data if there is a mechanism
HbAVSS n=4, t=1
k(number of values) Time taken Bandwidth at
node
Bandwidth at
dealer
1 4.72 3417 5244
100 15.81 297203 525839
1000 56.73 2987488 5276382
Table 5.2: Secret Sharing benchmarks
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1 if fn == "createInstance" {
2 // Create an instance of LinearRegression
3 LinReg := &LinReg{linearReg , instanceName , endParams}
4 LinReg.save()
5 return Success("Created Instance"))
6 } else if fn == "getActiveLinRegs" {
7 return getActiveLinRegs(stub)
8 } else if fn == "getCompletedLinRegs" {
9 return getCompletedLinRegs(stub)
10 } else if fn == "addData" {
11 // returns memory cells id for the user input
12 LinRegInstance := getInstance(key , stub)
13 memcellX , memcellY := getMemCellNames ()
14 createCell(stub , memcellX , args[1], "linReg")
15 createCell(stub , memcellY , args[1], "linReg")
16 LinRegInstance.X = append(LinRegInstance.X, memcellX)
17 LinRegInstance.Y = append(LinRegInstance.Y, memcellY)
18 LinRegInstance.save(stub)
19 return Success(memcellX , memcellY)
20 } else if fn == "runMPC" {
21 if len(LinRegInstance.X) < LinRegInstance.EndPoints && len(
LinRegInstance.Y) < LinRegInstance.EndPoints {
22 return Error("Not enough points")
23 }
24 for i, _ := range LinRegInstance.X {
25 var cellX , cellY secretcellX
26 cellX = getCellMetaData(stub , LinRegInstance.X[i])
27 cellY = getCellMetaData(stub , LinRegInstance.Y[i])
28 if cellX.IsWritten == false || cellY.IsWritten == false{
29 return Error("Unwritten cells")
30 }
31 }
32 cells := append(LinRegInstance.X, LinRegInstance.Y...)
33 mpcOp("linear_regression_mpc", LinRegInstance.Name , cells ...)
34 return Success(byte("Started")
35 } else if fn == "getResult" {
36 if checkMPCResult(stub , LinRegInstance.Name , "LinReg") == "None
" {
37 return Error("No Result yet")
38 }
39 LinRegInstance.Result = checkMPCResult(stub , LinRegInstance.
Name)
40 LinRegInstance.save()
41 return Success(LinRegInstance.Result)
42 }
Figure 5.8: Linear Regression Chaincode
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1
2 else if fn == "runMPC" {
3 Auction := GetAuctionInstance(auctionName)
4 for _, element := range Auction.Bids {
5 cell := getCellMetaData(stub , element)
6 if cell.IsWritten == false {
7 Error("Unwritten Bids")
8 }
9 }
10 outputCell = createCell(getCellName (), Auction.creatorKey)
11 cells := (Auction.Bids)
12 mpcOp("auction", Auction.Name , outputCell , cells ...)
13 return Success("Started MPC")
14 } else if fn == "getResult" {
15 Auction := GetAuctionInstance(auctionName)
16 if checkMPCResult(Auction.Name) == "None" {
17 return shim.Success ([] byte("None"))
18 }
19 Auction.Result = checkMPCResult(Auction.Name)
20 Auction.save()
21 return Success(Auction.Result)
22 }
Figure 5.9: Auction chaincode
Cost of running the application
Application Name Number of bits Number of
triples
Rounds of com-
munication
Rock Paper Scissors 0 0 2
Auction(N bids) 124N 187N 200N
Linear Regression 64 per epoch 19 per epoch 90 per epoch
Table 5.3: Application cost matrix
Running time for the applications n=4, t=1
Application Name Time taken(Cloaking
Fabric) in seconds
Time taken( HBMPC)
in seconds
overhead(in sec-
onds)
Rock Paper Scissors 6.72 3.67 3.05
Auction(7 bids) 19.17 17.37 1.8
Linear Regression(100
epochs)
52.43 47.24 5.19
Linear Regres-
sion(1000 epochs)
469.85 477.8 7.95
Table 5.4: Running time of different algorithms
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Running time for the applications n=4, t=1 with one failure
Application Name Time taken with 1
failures with Cloaking
Fabric
Time taken with 1
failure in HBMPC
Overhead(in sec-
onds)
Rock Paper Scissors 6.41 3.45 2.96
Auction(7 bids) 17.47 15.3 2.17
Linear Regression(100
epochs)
40.91 36.29 4.62
Linear Regres-
sion(1000 epochs)
393.24 387.30 5.93
Table 5.5: Running time of different algorithms with 1 failure
to store the secret of one party on multiple nodes but only the storing party would
know and have access to the actual secret. All the systems in the list support secret
data except the plain Hyperledger Fabric. Fabric channels do not qualify for this as
the data is visible to all parties in the channel of multiple parties and single party
channels would not be fault tolerant.
• Availability : Availability attributes to high fault tolerance, lack of single point of
failure and high resilience. Availability is crucial for running applications on wide area
networks with a large number of nodes. Scale Mamba implements a non-robust MPC
protocol which halts on detecting failures, MATRIX provides a centralized service for
coordinating MPC. This would be a single point of failure for the coordination service.
On the contrary Cloaking Fabric is backed by a blockchain which would be replicated
and provide high availability.
• Arbitrary Computations : Running arbitrary functions on the secret data would
be the third metric to compare with. Calypso stores encrypted data on the blockchain
and the key to access it would be stored as secret shares. Cloaking Fabric stores the
secret data as secret shares which can be used as inputs to MPC programs. Any com-
putation with respect to Calypso would involve reconstructing the secret, performing a
computation and encrypting the data again. This would involve a trusted third party
and would not be feasible.
5.3.2 Comparison With Prior Work in Fabric
Prior work by IBM Research[20] present a modification to Fabric to support private data.
In the paper, they mention that their work aims to be initial proof of concept in this direction.
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1 OutOf (3, ’Org1MSP.member ’, ’Org1MSP.member ’, ’Org2MSP.member ’, ’
Org2MSP.member ’)
Figure 5.10: Endorsement Policy Snippet
They mention the following shortcomings of their approach in the paper.
• Endorsement Policy : At the time of their writing Fabric did not provide enough
freedom to specify an Endorsement policy to align with the trust model of the MPC
protocol. Since then, Fabric has evolved to support a language to specify complex
endorsement policies and Cloaking Fabric makes full use of it. For example, the en-
dorsement policy in Figure 5.10 can be used in a n = 4, t = 1 setting for the first
network sample to require endorsements from 3 peers.
• Point to point communication : They opt for a centralized server to establish
communication channels between nodes for the point to point communication between
MPC peers. In Cloaking Fabric we use system chaincode which have the privilege to
set up sockets and mange their lifetime.
• Rogue Peers : In their implementation a rogue peer could deny to endorse an MPC
operation after learning the value of the computation. Cloaking Fabric uses endorse-
ment policies which are aligned to the MPC framework and can tolerate rogue peers
which do not endorse the result after executing it. On a side not the result of the MPC
operation could also be made private.
To summarize we address all the issues they describe in their implementation and provide
a comprehensive programming model with the abstraction of a secret cell.
5.3.3 Comparison of Cloaking Fabric’s Programming Model with MATRIX
MATRIX provides a centralized architecture for coordinating MPC protocols. MATRIX
comes bundled with an administrator component which is used to create, manage and start
MPC protocols. A web based user interface is provided to the administrator where they
can specify the title, description, registration time and type of result(MPC operation) and
create an entry which is then visible to all potential participants. It is apparent that this is
suitable for large scale deployments of simple MPC computations such as number surveys.
Compared to MATRIX, Cloaking Fabric is decentralized and runs as a part of a blockchain.
The chaincode based programming model allows developers to build customized applications.
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As we saw in Section 5.1 a variety of non-trivial applications are possible and follow the
same pattern as chaincode applications, thus giving developers freedom to implement more
comprehensive applications.
5.3.4 Experiment Setup
We run our experiments on a single server having 32 cores of Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E5-2620 v4 at 2.10GHz with 120Gb of RAM. We run every single component(node, orderer,
certificate authority) on separate docker containers and ensure they run on different physical
cores. We run each of the above described applications in isolation and we assume pre-
processed data(bits, triples) are readily available. For every experiment we take three runs
and average the measurements over the three runs. For all Cloaking Fabric measurements,
we measure the total time from when the client makes the request to the chaincode to when
the result is available at the client.
5.3.5 Performance of Cloaking Fabric
Table 5.3 shows the cost of running every application in terms of the number of pre-
processed elements(bits, triples) used and the rounds of communication for each applica-
tion. The running time of applications can be directly attributed to the number of rounds
of communication. There is still potential to improve the algorithms via batching to reduce
the number of rounds of communication. For comparison, Scale-Mamba implements com-
parison with just 7 rounds of communication compared to 200 rounds in HoneybadgerMPC.
MPC joins the darkside[38] reports that for an auction that has 156 comparisons it takes 4.7
seconds for 2 parties. That is 1092 rounds of communication. The 7 bid auction running on
Cloaking Fabric takes 17.47 seconds due the fact that there are 1400 rounds of communica-
tion. If we just compare the running times with respect to rounds of communication then
the two systems perform comparably. The other difference in time could be attributed to
Cloaking Fabric involving double the number of parties and offering a robust failure mode.
5.3.6 Secret-Sharing Performance
Table 5.2 benchmarks the bandwidth and time taken for secret-sharing using HbAVSS.
We measure the time from the client node which is sharing the value, this includes the
time taken to run createCell on the application chaincode. HbAVSS allows for multiple
values(k) to be shared simultaneously by running multiple instances of AVSS in different
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threads separately. The total bandwidth scales linearly at the dealer as well as the nodes
but the time taken reduces for larger values of k.
5.3.7 Overhead of Using Fabric
We measure the overhead of using the blockchain and chaincode programming model
compared to just running HoneybadgerMPC in Table 5.3. The overhead is defined as the
time taken to interact with the chaincode to create metadata, collect results and awaiting
results to be published on the blockchain. To measure the time taken in Cloaking Fabric,
we measure the duration between the invocation of the first chaincode endpoint that calls
mpcOp and the invocation of the endpoint that retrieves the published result. To measure
the time taken for just the MPC operation, we measure the time in the HoneybadgerMPC
codebase to start and complete the MPC operation. The results show that Cloaking Fabric
adds a large overhead compared to the total execution time for applications with low running
times, however as the running time increases the overhead becomes negligible compared to
the total time due to the fact that collecting results and awaiting the results to be published is
generally constant time. The difference in overhead time between Linear Regression running
100 epochs to 1000 epochs could be attributed to the more number of blocks created due
the client constantly polling the chaincode to collect the results. The created blocks need to
be gossiped and committed which takes time.
5.3.8 Performance with Failures
In Table 5.5 we measure the application run times when there is a crashed node. We crash
one of the nodes during MPC operation by killing the docker container and we measure the
total time it takes. We observe that the running time drops compared to the case with
failures. This can be attributed to lower bandwidth the nodes have to deal with. This is a
common occurrence in BFT protocols as well and was discussed in BFT under fire[24].
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a novel approach for a blockchain system to support private data and allow
arbitrary computations on the private data using Secure Multi-Party Computation. From the
evaluation above it is evident that compared to other systems like Calypso which support
private data on the blockchain, Cloaking Fabric leverages the chaincode (smart contract)
programming model and extends it to support MPC functions. The addition of having a
MPC coupled with blockchain is not very expensive and scales almost in a constant rate
with increase in overall running time.
6.1 FUTURE WORK
1. Testing and benchmarking on large number of nodes : Currently, we restrict our testing
to 4 nodes due to the lack of easy deployment methods of Fabric peers. Theoretically
fabric supports a large number of nodes in deployment and HoneybadgerMPC is also
known to support 100 nodes. It would be interesting to verify in practice and observe
performance with scalability.
2. Support for Zero Knowledge Proofs : Applications like linear regression make use of
Fixed Point fields. It would be beneficial to have support for Zero-Knowledge ranged
proofs to validate the input range entered by the client.
3. Integrating with oﬄine phase of HoneyBadgerMPC : HoneyBadgerMPC has a robust
oﬄine phase that generates pre-processing elements on the fly and replenishes their
supply on the go. Currently, we resort to using files generated prior to the execution
of the MPC application.
4. Improving the efficiency of applications presented : The applications presented here
like the auction and linear regression applications can be optimized to reduce the
number of rounds of communication. This would make the application run time closer
to that of Scale-Mamba.
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